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This  article presents supply elasticities for 10 major food crops 
produced and consumed in Fiji. The estimates were derived 
from a stated-intention survey of rural households. The 
results appear to be consistent with the dual nature of Fiji’s 
agricultural sector and show that agricultural supply response 
is own-price elastic for the commodities analysed.
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Agriculture contributes 11 per cent of 
Fiji’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 
contributes directly to the incomes of 
many people—especially the 49 per cent 
of the population living in rural areas. The 
incidence of poverty is much greater in rural 
areas than in urban areas and in general 
is higher for Indo-Fijians than for other 
ethnic groups (Table 1). In recent years, the 
economic performance of rural enterprises 
in Fiji has suffered from declining prices 
for key commodities and disruption in 
land-tenure arrangements for sugarcane 
growers. The end result has been a crisis in 
the financial outlook for those dependent 
on the rural sector.
The ability of the agricultural policy 
community to respond to the challenges 
facing Fiji is impaired by a lack of basic 
information about the sector. For example, 
there are no published estimates of farm 
supply responses to changes in food prices. 
Reflecting this gap, models to forecast the 
likely consequences of the current market 
disruptions and the impact of alternative 
policy regimes designed to deal with 
these problems are not well developed. 
Consequently, policymakers have little 
reliable information about the extent 
of the changes in food production and 
prices—levels and mixes—that might occur 
in the medium term. This is particularly 
important given the rural-to-urban drift of 
the population and the high proportion of 
family incomes that poorer people spend 
on basic foods.
Not only are there no published 
estimates of supply elasticities for food 
crops in Fiji, there are limited data for 
comparable production systems in other 
countries. Fleming and Hardaker (1986) 
analysed supply response in several South 
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Pacific countries, but not Fiji. They found 
that the export supply of bananas and taro 
(dalo in Fiji) from (then Western) Samoa was 
quite elastic in the longer run (bananas 2.1 
and taro 2.8). The short-run elasticities were 
markedly lower (bananas 0.6 and taro 0.4). 
Fleming and Hardaker (1986) also 
estimated domestic supply functions for 
root crops in Tonga and found the supply 
response to be highly sensitive to the level 
of prices. They reported a negative response 
to price changes in low-price periods, while 
there was a positive response when prices 
were relatively high. They explained the 
apparently perverse response in low-price 
periods as a reflection of the dominance of 
small producers focusing on income targets. 
The higher the price, the less these families 
needed to sell to achieve their income 
target to cover expenses such as school 
fees and social obligations. In higher-price 
periods, commercial motives tended to 
dominate supply decisions and the supply 
functions were sloped positively. Fleming 
and Hardaker found that at relatively high 
prices the supply of taro was inelastic but the 
supply of cassava and yams was elastic.
Fleming estimated supply elasticities 
for coffee (1999a), palm-oil (1999b), copra 
(1999c) and cocoa (1999d) in Papua New 
Guinea. He found the supply of all these 
commercial tree crops was inelastic in the 
short and long term. Rosegrant et al. (1998) 
report inelastic long-term supply elasticities 
in Indonesia for rice, corn, cassava and 
soybeans, which are also grown in Fiji.
It is not safe to assume that these earlier 
estimates will be relevant to the policy 
environment of Fiji today. The farming 
systems in Fiji are likely to differ from those 
elsewhere and all farming systems change 
over time. To ensure the advice they receive 
is reliable, policymakers need country 
and time-specific estimates of supply 
elasticities—not elasticities based on data 
from up to 30 years ago, such as some of 
the estimates reviewed above. Our objective 
was therefore to develop a set of own-price 
elasticities of supply for the important 
food items produced and consumed in Fiji, 
representative of price responses under 
current conditions.
Conceptual framework
Supply elasticities can be estimated in 
various ways. One method is to use time-
series data. The estimation of time-series 
models was precluded by the absence of 
reliable data (Walton 2002). For example, 
individual crop data frequently cover 
Table 1 Incomes and poverty in Fiji: results from the 2002–03 household survey
Group Annual household income (F$) Population in poverty (per cent)
Rural Urban All Fiji Rural Urban All Fiji
Fijians 11,082 16,539 12,972 38 27 34
Indo-Fijians 9,653 13,593 11,902 43 29 36
Others 11,066 21,877 19,105 41 17 24
Average 10,559 15,267 12,753 40 27 34
Note: The exchange rate in late January 2008 was roughly A$1 = F$1.35 or F$1 = A$0.74. 
Source: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, 2008. 2007 Facts and Figures. Available from www.statsfiji.gov.fj (accessed 
20 January 2008).
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largely commercial production and exclude 
much of the subsistence production for 
home use, which is significant for most food 
crops. Moreover, the basis of collection has 
changed over time, so the consistency of the 
available time-series data is questionable.
Another approach would be to develop 
models based on an optimising framework 
and to derive the elasticity estimates through 
model simulations that rest, at least implicitly, 
on a relatively tight set of behavioural 
assumptions (Singh et al. 1986). 
For the present analysis, we use a stated-
preference technique. In essence, our method 
is a non-parametric approach to implicitly 
deriving individual supply elasticities 
from stated-preference data gathered in a 
producer/household survey. We surveyed 
rural food-producing households and 
asked them how much they produced of 
each of a range of products. We then asked 
how production of each item would change 
if its price were to fall while the prices of 
other products remained unchanged. In 
particular, we asked households to indicate 
their ‘choke’ price for each product—that 
is, the price at which they would stop 
producing the particular item, all other prices 
held constant. From this information, we 
derive implicit household product supply 
curves for each item. We then derive the 
unrestricted household and product-specific 
supply elasticities that can be averaged or 
aggregated to market supply elasticities.
The general form of the own-price 
elasticity of supply is given by the well-
known equation
Q
P
P
Q
*
 (1)
in which ε  is the own-price elasticity of 
supply for some good, x; Q is the quantity 
of good, x, supplied; and P is the farm-gate 
price of good x.
Rearranging Equation 1 gives the 
elasticity in terms of prices
=
Q
Q
P
P
*
 = 
P
P
 (2)
in which P∆  is the difference between the 
current market price and the choke price or 
price intercept of the supply curve.
Assuming linearity, the individual 
producer’s own-price supply elasticity is 
completely identified by the existing market 
price and the change in price needed to 
induce the producer to cease production 
of the good. This choke price represents 
the lower limit on the opportunity cost of 
resources in the production of the good for 
that particular producer and can be obtained 
directly in a stated-preference survey of 
producers. The market price is available 
from official data or can be collected from 
each respondent. We asked producers to 
list market prices received by, or familiar 
to, them as a means of self-referencing their 
stated production responses. This procedure 
helped in allowing for any quality differences 
in production between producers.
Our survey approach to estimating 
elasticities employs contingent valuation 
techniques used widely in the environmental 
economics literature and has the advantage 
that it does not require possibly questionable 
time-series data. It also generates supply 
elasticities based on current circumstances 
rather than on average circumstances, 
potentially extending long into the past. 
Ideally, the ‘current circumstances’ should 
be reasonably ‘normal’ if the estimated 
elasticities are to have a reasonable shelf life. 
The stated-preference method does rely on 
the assumption that the individual supply 
curves are at least approximately linear and 
suffers from the well-known reservations 
attached to the CVM approach to valuation 
(see Hanemann 1994 for a discussion).
The supply system underpinning the 
approach is illustrated in Figure 1. Assume 
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there are three rural households engaged 
in farm production. Two of these are 
‘commercial’ farming households—that is, 
they produce for market sale. One household 
is a subsistence producer: it produces only 
for its own use. The two commercial farm 
households are represented by their supply 
curves, S1 and S2. The subsistence household 
is represented by SS, which shows that 
subsistence production is QS, regardless of 
the level of market prices. For each crop 
produced by each commercial household, 
we obtain their choke price (PC1 and PC2) and 
production (Q1 and Q2) at the current market 
price, PE. We use the survey information 
on PE, Q1, Q2, PC1 and PC2 to estimate the 
supply curves, S1 and S2, for each household. 
There is no choke price for the subsistence 
household because, as noted already, it 
produces QS regardless of price. 
The supply curves for each commercial 
farm derived from the survey responses can 
be summed in the usual way to generate 
the aggregate commercial supply curve, 
SC. The addition of subsistence production 
QS to SC generates the total supply curve, 
ST.  In the case of SC, its intercept, aC, is the 
sum of the intercepts a1 and a2 of S1 and S2. 
Similarly, the slopes of SC and ST are identical 
and equal to the sum of the slopes of S1 
and S2. The aggregation procedure shown 
in Figure 1 will result in a non-continuous 
or kinked function with as many kinks as 
there are households with differently sloped 
household functions.
The supply elasticities we estimate 
here are intended ultimately as inputs to 
an agricultural policy simulation model for 
Fiji. Our primary concern, then, is to obtain 
estimates of the market elasticities at the 
points where PE intersects SC and ST. Our 
intended approach is to estimate the relevant 
market elasticities and then to derive the 
functions making up the simulation model 
by imposing an appropriate functional 
form onto the elasticities. This procedure is 
analogous to the more conventional time-
series approach under which functional 
Figure 1  A system of implicit supply curves
Price
Quantity
PC1
PE
PC2
QS QT
SSSCS2S1
ST
0a1 a2aC Q2Q1 aT QC
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forms are imposed on the data and elasticity 
estimates are then derived from the estimated 
equations. 
Data and estimation
The data for the reported elasticity estimates 
were collected in a 2007 survey of rural food-
producing households in Fiji. The survey 
was a quasi-random sample based on the 
survey list from Fiji’s 2002–03 Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES), 
which itself was based on the distribution 
of households in the 1996 Census. Narsey 
(2006) describes the HIES and summarises 
some of its results.
To be included in our survey, households 
had to have sold any one of a number of 
farm products and/or to have been engaged 
in subsistence food production in 2003.1 The 
HIES identifies 20 agricultural and fisheries 
products including cassava, dalo, rice, 
bananas, pineapples, poultry, sugarcane 
and, of course, yaqona, the base of kava. We 
attempted to select statistically adequate 
samples of households that had produced 
the ‘smaller’ crops while leaving it to the 
sampling as a whole to include enough 
households growing major crops such as 
cassava and sugarcane.
The sample was stratified by statistical 
division. We clustered households to 
reduce travel costs and were mindful of 
including adequate numbers of Fijian and 
Indo-Fijian households because earlier 
research by Tubuna et al. (2007) had 
indicated differences in the farming systems 
applicable to the two groups. For financial 
reasons, we excluded households from the 
more remote outer islands, but households 
from isolated areas on Viti Levu and 
Vanua Levu were surveyed. The survey 
also covered the island of Kadavu as it is 
important in commercial yaqona production. 
The survey data were obtained in face-to-
face interviews conducted by staff from the 
Fiji Islands Ministry of Primary Industries.
We recognise our sampling procedure is 
not necessarily optimal; however, details of 
the sample summarised in Table 2 do suggest 
the sample is broadly consistent with the 
geographical and ethnic distribution of 
rural households and with their agricultural 
commodity focus.
Our sample is a 1.1 per cent sample of 
rural households (HIES 2.7 per cent). In 
aggregate, Indo-Fijian households are under-
represented in our sample as it contains 
seemingly ‘too few’ Indo-Fijian households 
from the Western Division and especially 
too few Western Division sugarcane-
producing households. Nevertheless, we 
consider the sample of 52 Western Division 
sugarcane producers sufficient for statistical 
purposes.
Results
The elasticities reported here show medium 
to longer-term responses under certainty. 
Respondents were asked to consider a 
scenario with a guaranteed or certain price 
over a period sufficient for a production 
response, rather than an immediate change 
in price of uncertain duration. 
The estimates presented in Table 3 are 
based on raw survey data. In addition, the 
individual household data have not been 
calibrated to a single representative market 
price, PE, and are not weighted by their 
sample weights. The estimated household 
elasticities have, however, been ‘winsorised’2 
to reduce the impacts of outliers on the mean 
elasticities (Olive 2007).
We have winsorised the derived elasticity 
values rather than their source data. In 
principle, the values of the household 
elasticities can range widely—from negative 
values (the ‘peasant effect’) to zero (pure 
subsistence production)—and then to a 
agricultural  suPPly  rEsPonsE  in  fiji
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range of positive values extending even 
to infinity (when the current price equals 
the choke price). Our main problem has 
been with a few households for which the 
elasticities appear to be very large and in 
some cases even infinite. 
The winsorisation procedure enables us 
to keep these households in the calculations 
at elasticity values that are arithmetically 
tractable and, we believe, plausible. 
We truncate the top elasticities at values 
equal to the means plus two standard errors 
of the distributions of the unadjusted values 
of the raw elasticities greater than zero 
but excluding the infinite values. If the 
distributions were normal, the procedure 
would cut off only the top 2.5 per cent of 
the distribution of the unadjusted raw 
estimates.3 As indicated in Appendix Table 
1, the winsorisation ranged from a low of 5 
per cent of the estimates (cassava) to a high 
of 24 per cent (rice).
Our elasticities are not directly 
comparable with estimates published 
elsewhere because ours are for individual 
household, not total market, elasticities. 
That said, the results from our sample 
appear to be reasonably consistent with the 
Fleming and Hardaker (1986) estimates for 
bananas and dalo in Western Samoa, despite 
the differences of time and country. In fact, 
our elasticities for bananas and dalo for 
commercial households fall quite close to 
the long-run values reported in the earlier 
study. And, like Fleming and Hardaker’s 
estimates for Tonga, our estimates indicate 
that agricultural supply in Fiji is own-price 
elastic.
Aside from the Fleming and Hardaker 
comparison, our elasticities appear to be 
relatively high compared with the values 
reported by Fleming (1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 
1999d), Rosegrant et al. (1998) and values 
used in some global partial-equilibrium 
Table 2  Selected details of rural sample (number of households)
Item Central Northern Western Total Fiji
 HIES Sample HIES Sample HIES Sample Total HIES Sample 
       population
Ethnic group 
Fijian 687 336 271 197 376 171 51,282 1,334 704 
Indo-Fijian 53 21 210 103 583 84 30,631 846 208 
Other 19 1 25 15 6 1 1,756 50 17 
Total 759 358 506 315 965 256 83,669 2,230 929
Commodity earningsa        
Cassava 187 120 10 10 84 59 10,582 281 199 
Dalo 1 1 17 17 - - 716 18 18 
Rice 218 161 108 93 59 52 15,781 385 306 
Sugarcane - - 63 31 306 52 13,128 369 83 
Yaqona 218 134 131 109 51 45 16,196 400 288 
Bananas 91 67 5 5 58 49 5,559 154 121 
Pineapples 16 12 5 5 6 6 1,062 27 23
a households reporting earnings from products shown 
Note: Eastern Division included in Central Division.  
Source: Raikoti, T., 2006. Personal communication, Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, October 2006.
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models. One example is the SWOPSIM 
model used to inform the policy debate for 
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations 
(Roningen and Dixit 1989). The data 
for that model included 33 countries/
regions and 22 commodities represented 
by 638 medium-term supply elasticities. Of 
these elasticities—admittedly mostly for 
temperate-zone products—only two were 
greater than 1 (Sullivan et al. 1992).
So far, we have precluded the possibility 
of negative supply elasticities associated 
with the ‘peasant effect’ reported by Fleming 
and Hardaker (1986). We do, however, find 
evidence of a dual-production system, 
consistent with the results of earlier research 
for Seaqaqa Tikina (or district) on Vanua 
Levu (Tubuna et al. 2007). In particular, 
we find significant differences between the 
own-price responses of Fijian and Indo-
Fijian households (Table 4).
These differences are likely to be 
dependent mostly on differences in the 
farming systems applicable to the two groups 
rather than on ethnicity per se. At least 89 
per cent4 of the Fijian households in our 
sample operate on Mataqali, or communal, 
land by customary right, rather than under 
any formal lease arrangements. Many of 
these households follow a farming system 
characterised by a very low reliance on 
purchased inputs. In contrast, only 5 per 
cent of Indo-Fijian households seem to farm 
Mataqali land, with the remainder farming 
either freehold or formally leased land (Table 
5). Nearly 60 per cent of the Indo-Fijian 
households farming under Native Land Trust 
Board (NLTB) leases (of Mataqali land) grow 
sugarcane.
The highest values of the estimated 
elasticities are those for rice, coconuts, 
sugarcane and yaqona. The high value 
Table 4  Ethnicity–related differences in elasticitiesa
Commodity All Fiji Fijians Indo–Fijians t value Significant differenceb
     95 per cent 99 per cent
Cassava 2.06 2.05 2.16 –6.43 Yes Yes
Dalo 2.28 2.21 2.96 –40.34 Yes Yes
Rice 4.52 13.69 2.99 11.50 Yes Yes
Coconuts 2.67 2.43 2.99 –6.02 Yes Yes
Sugarcane 3.45 3.71 3.38 2.84 Yes Yes
Yaqona 3.55 3.56 3.28 3.07 Yes Yes
Bananas 1.96 1.95 2.02 –2.59 Yes Yes
Pawpaws 2.37 2.34 2.41 –0.82 No No
Pineapples 2.51 2.85 1.74 11.33 Yes Yes
Bele 2.29 2.34 2.23 2.18 Yes No
a ethnicity based on ethnicity of the head of household or ‘Person 1’. 
b test of the significance of the difference between two sample means using a two–tail test (Karmel 1963:98)  
Note: Sample statistics not adjusted for winsorisation of the elasticities.
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for rice might reflect the relatively small 
sample of households that reported price-
responsive rice production. There might, 
however, be more substantive reasons for 
the relatively high supply elasticities for 
coconuts, sugarcane and yaqona.
The high elasticity for coconuts could 
arise from the fact that coconut supply can 
be a basic production decision as well as a 
harvesting decision—that is, a decision to 
not collect or collect and process fallen nuts. 
Yaqona can be harvested after about a year but 
becomes more potent if left to mature in the 
ground. In this sense, yaqona is like a ‘bank 
account in the ground’ because the capital 
stock earns interest if left in the ground. 
Because of the flexibility in harvesting the 
crop, yaqona appears to be a particularly 
useful crop for meeting the family and 
social obligations of subsistence and smaller 
commercial producers. Significantly, yaqona 
plays this banker role principally for 
Fijian households. Of the 190 households 
producing ‘price-responsive’ yaqona, only 
six were Indo-Fijian households.
The relatively high elasticities for 
sugarcane could result from our sample 
of sugarcane-producing households better 
representing mixed rather than specialist 
sugarcane farms. The mixed farms are likely 
to be more responsive to price changes 
because they are likely to be on more 
marginal sugar country and, at current 
prices, probably already have profitable 
alternatives to sugarcane.5
The estimated elasticities also differ 
by region. For all the possible pair-wise 
comparisons in the regional elasticities 
shown in Appendix Table 1, there are 
significant differences between all the 
elasticities shown. As with the ethnicity-
related differences, these regional differences 
are likely to reflect differences in farming 
systems—as in the case of sugarcane 
described above.
This study is unusual in reporting 
individual household elasticities, so we 
should comment briefly on the distributions 
of the estimated values. The distributions 
for cassava, dalo and sugarcane are shown 
in Figure 2. The distributions for all the 
commodities are positively skewed, with 
that for dalo possibly the most uni-modal 
of the three shown. The overall bi-modal 
distribution for sugarcane helps ‘explain’ 
the difference between the average Western 
Division and Northern Division elasticities. 
The modal elasticity for the larger number 
of Western Division sugarcane growers 
is about 1.75 while that for the Northern 
Division growers is higher, at 2.75.
Concluding comments
Contrary to our initial expectations, the 
medium to long-term elasticities reported 
here appear to be generally consistent with 
the levels reported by Fleming and Hardaker 
(1986) some 20 years ago. In an analytical 
Table 5 Land tenure ‘Plot 1’: surveyed households
Household ethnicitya Freehold NLTB* lease Mataqali Other lease Share Total 
     cropping
 Percentage of households 
Fijian  2.5 5.6 88.8 2.0 1.1 100.0 
Indo-Fijian  30.7 46.7 5.0 17.6 0.0 100.0
a ethnicity of head of household or ‘Person 1’ 
* Native Land Trust Board
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Figure 2  Distribution of selected elasticities by division
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sense, this would mean that the production 
system represented by our elasticities is 
probably less responsive than the systems 
analysed by Fleming and Hardaker because 
we report medium to long-term responses 
under certainty. 
Leaving that aside, perhaps the 
unexpected similarity in the levels of the 
elasticity estimates is not surprising after 
all.
Much of the agriculture in Samoa 
and Tonga was then—and probably is 
still—based on traditional farming on 
communal land. This is certainly the case 
for a significant part of Fiji’s agriculture; 
hence, the unexpected similarities in 
elasticities might be the result of similarities 
in farming systems then and now. The fact 
that the elasticities reported here are higher 
than levels that have been used for largely 
temperate-zone products might be because 
a good deal of Fiji’s agriculture relies on few, 
if any, purchased inputs. Given this, and the 
widespread availability of ample land—at 
least to traditional owners—it is probably 
easy for households to modify production 
levels and switch between outputs.
Whatever the final judgment about the 
values of the elasticities, it is clear from our 
estimates that the food-production sector in 
Fiji is highly diverse. While we did consider 
restricting our survey to Viti Levu to save 
time and costs, it was clearly appropriate 
to spread our sample more broadly across 
Fiji. Our analysis supports the earlier 
conclusions of Tubuna et al. (2007) that 
Fiji’s agriculture is essentially characterised 
by a dualism captured by the phrase ‘Two 
groups, two systems and two crops’. There 
are two predominant ethnic groups (Fijians 
and Indo-Fijians), two farming systems (on 
communal land and on leased or freehold 
land) and two key cash crops (yaqona and 
sugarcane). While broad generalisations are 
risky, we find that in general ethnic Fijians 
farm Mataqali or communal land and grow 
yaqona as their principal cash crop; Indo-
Fijians farm leased or freehold land and, 
broadly speaking, grow sugarcane as their 
main cash crop.
For each crop considered here, we 
divided the sample households producing 
the crop into pure subsistence and ‘price-
responsive’ households. Considered over all 
their production, however, the exposure of 
rural households to the market will be one 
of degree rather than a simple dichotomy. 
Commercial producers will all produce 
some food for family consumption and most 
subsistence producers have at least some 
exposure to the market through intermittent 
sales of surplus produce or through 
supplying their labour to commercial 
farms. We believe the own-price elasticities 
of supply for food crops are likely to differ 
markedly between producers who, taking 
account of their entire production regime, 
might be classified as ‘commercial’ and 
subsistence producers. The identification 
of these differences will be the subject of 
further research.
Overall, we find agricultural supply 
responses in Fiji to be own-price elastic—at 
least in the medium to longer term. This 
means that the contribution of agriculture 
to Fiji’s economic development could be 
substantial if the profitability of farming can 
be increased. In particular, policies that help 
relax the resource constraints in the sector 
offer significant gains for the community 
as a whole. Fiji therefore has much to gain 
from policies that help to resolve land-
tenure problems and the related problems 
in gaining access to credit, and from policies 
that support targeted extension and research 
and development in an appropriate way 
and improve marketing efficiency. Based on 
related research (Tubuna et al. 2007; Tubuna 
forthcoming), it would be helpful if it were 
possible to take a longer-term and more 
strategic approach to agricultural research 
and development and development efforts. 
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In that way, Fiji might be able to progress 
beyond the stop–start nature of some of its 
earlier agricultural development initiatives 
under which production of particular 
commodities expanded for a time, only to 
subsequently decline.
Notes
1 The urban component of the HIES was 
conducted from March 2002 to February 2003, 
while the rural survey covered the period 
May 2003 to April 2004. As Narsey (2006:1) 
explains, the urban and rural components 
of the Household Income and Expenditures 
Survey had to be split because of funding 
constraints related to the political events of 
2000.
2 Winsorisation refers to the formalised editing 
of outliers in statistical data sets. In its simplest 
form, winsorisation would involve setting all 
values above and below critical values to 
equal the critical values, perhaps defined as 
some percentile value. Winsorisation appears 
to be a common procedure and has been used 
by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in its 
Household Expenditure Survey (www.abs.
gov.au search for ‘winsorised’).
3 We excluded any negative elasticity values 
thrown up by the arithmetic because, on 
the basis of casual observation, the negative 
values seemed to be the result of data input 
errors. 
4 This figure is based on details for ‘Plot 1’ 
only—usually the largest of the plots farmed 
by a household. 
5 The uncertain outlook for the industry in Fiji 
might also be a contributor. Depending on 
world market conditions, the changes to the 
European Union’s import arrangements—the 
‘sugar shock’—might reduce the market 
returns for Fiji’s sugar by about 30 per cent 
below the price of F$51 in 2007—that is, 
to about F$35 a tonne. Based on the raw 
sample data, about 20 per cent of sugarcane-
producing households indicated a choke price 
above F$35 a tonne. Therefore, according to 
these preliminary results, it is possible that 
Fiji’s sugarcane production might—other 
things remaining constant—decline by a 
further 20 per cent as a result of the sugar 
shock.
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